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Abstract
Arlotto and Gurvich (2019) showed that regret in the multisecretary problem is bounded,
both in the number of job openings, n, and the number of applicants, k, provided that the
applicant valuations have finite support. I study what happens when applicant valuations have
continuous support. Specifically, I show that the regret grows like log(n) when valuations are
drawn from a standard uniform distribution. So the regret, while not finite, still grows very
slowly. However, the mechanism is completely different in this setting: the agent makes a finite
number of costly mistakes in the discrete case, but makes an infinite number of nearly costless
mistakes in the continuous case.
Keywords : Secretary problem; multisecretary problem; regret bounds; compensated coupling;
revenue management
1 Introduction
Caley (1875) introduced the secretary problem in the nineteenth century (Freeman, 1983; Ferguson,
1989). The problem is to hire a man to serve as your secretary (a man because most secretaries
were men back then). There are n applicants for the position, whom you interview sequentially.
But there’s a hitch: once you interview a man, you must decide whether or not to hire him before
interviewing the next man. Thus, you face an optimal stopping problem, with the objective being
to maximize the expected capability of the man you hire or, equivalently, minimize your regret,
which is defined as the expected capability difference between the most capable man and the man
you hire.
Arlotto and Gurvich (2019) studied the multisecretary problem, which is the same as above ex-
cept with k posts to fill, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n−1. In this version of the problem, your regret is the expected
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capability difference between the k most capable men and the k men you hire. Arlotto and Gurvich
made a startling discovery: If secretary valuations are i.i.d. random variables with finite support,
then the regret you face is uniformly bounded across n and k. In other words, there exists some
finite N such that you will never make more than N hiring mistakes in expectation, for all n and
k.
This is a visionary result. However, Arlotto and Gurvich (2019, p. 251) conclude their article
by conceding that they’re not sure whether or not it hinges on their assumption that the applicants’
capabilities are limited to a discrete set of values:
We have proved that in the multisecretary problem with independent candidate abilities
drawn from a common finite-support distribution, the regret is constant and achievable
by a multithreshold policy. In our model, the decision maker knows and makes crucial
use of the distribution of candidate abilities. Two obvious extensions to consider are
the problem instances in which the ability distribution is continuous and/or unknown
to the decision maker.
Although one would like to think of the continuous distribution as a “limit” of discrete
ones, our analysis does build to a great extent on this discreteness, and our bounds
depend on the cardinality of the support. At this point, it is not clear whether bounded
regret is achievable also with continuous distributions.
Vera and Banerjee (2019), Bumpensanti and Wang (2018), and Vera et al. (2019) streamlined and
generalized Arlotto and Gurvich’s argument. But all of their extensions assumed discrete valu-
ations, and thus all leveraged the same fundamental mechanism that Arlotto and Gurvich had
identified: a concentration of measure in the customer-count distributions. Basically, these dis-
tributions are so thin-tailed that the probability of making a hiring mistake shrinks exponentially
fast, which ensures a finite number of hiring mistakes.
But this isn’t so when valuations are drawn from the continuum. Indeed, in this case, the number
of hiring mistakes grows like
√
n. Hence, it seems like the regret should grow quickly (i.e., like
√
n),
but it actually grows slowly (i.e., like log(n)). Why? Well, because unlike in Arlotto and Gurvich’s
setting, the cost of making a hiring mistake also decreases with n. So switching to the continuum
makes the problem harder in one regard but easier in another: it increases the probability of making
a hiring mistake, but decreases the cost of such a mistake.
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2 Setup
You are seeking to hire k ≥ 1 secretaries from a pool of n > k candidates. You interview the
candidates sequentially. Once you interview a man, you must either hire him on the spot or reject
him for good. The candidates’ capabilities are independent standard uniform random variables.
You seek to maximize the total sum capability of your workforce.
Let vn,k represent your team’s expected capability, given that you start with n applicants for k
positions. This expected capability satisfies the following Bellman equations:
vn,k =
∫ 1
v=0
(
max
h∈{0,1}
h
(
v + vn−1,k−1
)
+ (1− h)vn−1,k
)
dv
= max
p∈[0,1]
∫ 1
v=1−p
(v + vn−1,k−1)dv +
∫ 1−p
v=0
vn−1,kdv
= max
p∈[0,1]
p(1− p/2) + pvn−1,k−1 + (1− p)vn−1,k
=pn,k(1− pn,k/2) + pn,kvn−1,k−1 + (1− pn,k)vn−1,k,
where v is the capability of the first man you interview, h is a Boolean that specifies whether you
hire him, and
pn,k = argmax
p∈[0,1]
p(1− p/2) + pvn−1,k−1 + (1− p)vn−1,k
is the probability that you hire him. That is, you hire the first man you interview if and only if his
capability exceeds 1− pn,k.
Let sn,j represent the capability of the jth most capable man in the initial pool of n men. Since
the applicants’ capabilities follow standard uniforms, order statistic sn,j follows a Beta(n− j+1, j)
distribution, with mean µn,j =
n−j+1
n+1 and cumulative distribution function Fn,j(x) =
B(x,n−j+1,j)
B(1,n−j+1,j) ,
where B(x, a, b) =
∫ x
t=0 t
a−1(1− t)b−1dt is the incomplete beta function.
Now, if you could always pick the k most capable applicants, your team’s expected capability
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would be v∗n,k =
∑k
j=1 E(sn,j). Note that this value function satisfies recurrence relations
1
v∗n,k =µn,k + v
∗
n,k−1
=λn,k + v
∗
n−1,k
=λn,k + µn−1,k + v∗n−1,k−1,
where λn,k =
∫ 1
sn−1,k=0
∫ 1
v=0
(
v − sn−1,k)+dvdFn−1,k(sn−1,k)
=
k(k + 1)
2n(n+ 1)
.
The first equation states that the value of incrementing your team size from k − 1 to k equals the
expected capability of the kth most capable applicant. The second equation states that the value
of incrementing your applicant pool from n − 1 to n equals the expected value of the option of
replacing the kth most capable man, out of the remaining n−1 applicants, with the nth man. And
the third equation states that the value of incrementing both your team size and your applicant
pool equals the value of incrementing your team size plus the value of incrementing your applicant
pool.
1 It’s well known that the following hold for integers a and b:
∫ y
x=0
B(x, a, b)dx =B(y, a, b+ 1)− (1− y)B(y, a, b),
∫ 1
x=0
xB(x, a, b)dx =B(1, a, b+ 1)−B(1, a, b+ 2)/2,
and B(1, a, b) =
(a− 1)!(b− 1)!
(a+ b− 1)! .
And these identities imply that
λn,k =
∫ 1
v=0
∫ 1
sn−1,k=0
(
v − sn−1,k)+dFn−1,k(sn−1,k)dv
=
∫
1
v=0
∫ v
sn−1,k=0
Fn−1,k(sn−1,k)dsn−1,kdv
=
∫
1
v=0
∫ v
sn−1,k=0
B(sn−1,k, n− k, k)
B(1, n− k, k) dsn−1,kdv
=
∫ 1
v=0
B(v, n− k, k + 1)− (1− v)B(v, n− k, k)
B(1, n− k, k) dv
=
B(1, n− k, k + 2)
2B(1, n− k, k)
=
k(k + 1)
2n(n+ 1)
.
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3 Regret Decomposition
Your regret is the expected cost of your hiring mistakes:
rn,k =v
∗
n,k − vn,k.
And your myopic regret is the expected cost of your current hiring mistake, given hiring probability
p:
mn,k(p) =
∫ 1−p
v=0
∫ v
sn−1,k=0
(v − sn−1,k)dFn−1,k(sn−1,k)dv +
∫ 1
v=1−p
∫ 1
sn−1,k=v
(sn−1,k − v)dFn−1,k(sn−1,k)dv
=
∫ 1
sn−1,k=0
∫ 1
v=0
(v − sn−1,k)+dvdFn−1,k(sn−1,k) +
∫ 1
sn−1,k=0
∫ 1
v=1−p
(sn−1,k − v)dvdFn−1,k(sn−1,k)
=λn,k +
∫ 1
sn−1,k=0
(
p(sn−1,k − 1 + p/2)
)
dFn−1,k(sn−1,k)
=λn,k + p(µn−1,k − 1 + p/2).
Your current hiring decision is a classification problem: you must decide whether to classify the
current applicant as “hired” or “not hired.” And as with all classification problems, you can make
a Type I error—hiring a man you shouldn’t have—or a Type II error—failing to hire a man you
should have. The second double integral on the first line denotes the expected Type I error cost:
in this case, the man’s value, v, exceeds your capability threshold, 1− p, and so you hire him, but
you shouldn’t have, as v does not exceed the value of the kth best man from the remaining n − 1
pool of candidates, sn−1,k. Similarly, the first double integral on the first line denotes the expected
Type II error cost: in this case, the man’s value, v, does not meet your capability threshold, 1− p,
and so you don’t hire him, but you should have, as v exceeds the value of the kth best man from
the remaining n− 1 pool of candidates, sn−1,k.
The myopic regret is important, because the total regret decomposes, by induction, into a sum
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of expected myopic regrets, as Vera and Banerjee (2019) demonstrated:
rn,k =v
∗
n,k − vn,k
=v∗n,k − pn,k(1− pn,k/2)− pn,kvn−1,k−1 − (1− pn,k)vn−1,k
=− pn,k(1− pn,k/2) + pn,k(v∗n,k − vn−1,k−1) + (1− pn,k)(v∗n,k − vn−1,k)
=− pn,k(1− pn,k/2) + pn,k(λn,k + µn−1,k + v∗n−1,k−1 − vn−1,k−1) + (1− pn,k)(λn,k + v∗n−1,k − vn−1,k)
=− pn,k(1− pn,k/2) + pn,k(λn,k + µn−1,k + rn−1,k−1) + (1− pn,k)(λn,k + rn−1,k)
=λn,k + pn,k(µn−1,k − 1 + pn,k/2) + pn,krn−1,k−1 + (1− pn,k)rn−1,k
=mn,k(pn,k) + pn,krn−1,k−1 + (1− pn,k)rn−1,k
=
n∑
t=1
E
(
mt,w(t)(pt,w(t))
)
,
where {w(t)}nt=1 is a random walk characterizing the number of open positions under the optimal
policy. This random walk satisfies w(n) = k, and w(t − 1) = w(t) − 1 with probability pt,w(t) and
w(t− 1) = w(t)− 1 otherwise.
4 Upper Bound
Suppose you follow the myopic policy of always minimizing your myopic regret. That is, suppose
you hire the first man you interview if and only if his capability exceeds 1− p̂n,k, where
p̂n,k =argmin
p∈[0,1]
mn,k(p)
= argmin
p∈[0,1]
λn,k + p(µn−1,k − 1 + p/2)
=1− µn−1,k.
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In this case, your myopic regret would be
mn,k(p̂n,k) =λn,k + p̂n,k(µn−1,k − 1 + p̂n,k/2)
=λn,k + (1− µn−1,k)(µn−1,k − 1 + (1− µn−1,k)/2)
=λn,k − (1− µn−1,k)2/2
=
k(k + 1)
2n(n+ 1)
−
(
1− n− k
n
)2
/2
=
1
8(n+ 1)
− (2k − n)
2
8n2(n+ 1)
.
By induction, we find that your total regret would be
r̂n,k =mn,k(p̂n,k) + p̂n,kr̂n−1,k−1 + (1− p̂n,k)r̂n−1,k
=
n∑
t=1
E
(
mt,ŵ(t)(p̂t,ŵ(t))
)
,
where {ŵ(t)}nt=1 is a random walk characterizing the number of open positions under the myopic
policy. This random walk satisfies ŵ(n) = k, and ŵ(t − 1) = ŵ(t) − 1 with probability p̂t,ŵ(t) and
ŵ(t− 1) = ŵ(t) otherwise.
Note that your myopic regret is uniformly bounded by
mt,ŵ(t)(p̂t,ŵ(t)) =
1
8(t+ 1)
− (2ŵ(t)− t)
2
8t2(t+ 1)
≤ 1
8(t+ 1)
.
And combining this bound with the fact that your regret under the optimal policy is no larger than
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your regret under the myopic policy implies
rn,k ≤r̂n,k
=
n∑
t=1
E
(
mt,ŵ(t)(p̂t,ŵ(t))
)
≤
n∑
t=1
1
8(t+ 1)
<
∫ n+1
t=1
1
8t
dt
= log(n + 1)/8.
5 Lower Bound
I now derive a regret lower bound for the case in which you have k = n/2 positions to fill. My
argument has seven steps.
First, I show that pn,k = 1 − pn,n−k. To see this, note that we can re-express the problem of
maximizing the capability of each of the k agents you choose as maximizing one minus the capability
of each of the n − k agents you don’t choose. But one minus a uniform is also a uniform, so this
mirror image problem yields mirror image choice probabilities.
Second, the symmetry of your choice probabilities implies that {w(t)}nt=1, the random walk
defined in section 2, is symmetric about the t/2 line. More specifically, the choice probability
symmetry implies that for any sample path {w1(t)}nt=1 there exists an equally likely sample path
{w2(t)}nt=1 that satisfies w1(t)+w2(t) = t for all t ∈ {1, · · · , n}. And this implies that E(w(t)) = t/2.
Third, you won’t become pickier when you have more spots to fill, so pn,k will not decrease in
k. Combining this fact with the symmetry of your choice probabilities implies that pn,k ≤ 1/2 for
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k ≤ n/2 and pn,k ≥ 1/2 for k ≥ n/2. And this, with E(w(t)) = t/2, implies that
Cov
(
w(t− 1)− w(t), w(t))
=E
((
w(t− 1)− w(t)− E(w(t− 1)− w(t)))(w(t)− E(w(t))))
=E
(
(1/2 − pt,w(t))(w(t) − t/2)
)
=Pr(w(t) ≤ t/2)E ( (1/2 − pt,w(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(w(t) − t/2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
| w(t) ≤ t/2)
+ Pr(w(t) > t/2)E
(
(1/2 − pt,w(t))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
(w(t) − t/2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
| w(t) > t/2)
≤0.
Fourth, I will prove by induction that Var(w(t)) ≤ Var(w˜(t)), where {w˜(t)}nt=1 is the random
walk with w˜(n) = k, and w˜(t−1) = w˜(t)−1 with probability one half and w˜(t−1) = w˜(t) otherwise.
The initial case is trivial, since Var(w(n)) = Var(w˜(n)) = Var(k) = 0. And for the inductive case,
note that Var(w(t)) ≤ Var(w˜(t)) implies
Var(w(t− 1)) =Var (w(t) + (w(t − 1)− w(t)))
=Var(w(t)) + Var
(
w(t− 1)−w(t)) + 2Cov (w(t), w(t − 1)− w(t))
≤Var(w(t)) + Var (w(t− 1)−w(t))
=Var(w(t)) + Var
(
w(t)− w(t− 1))
=Var(w(t)) + pt,w(t)(1− pt,w(t))
≤Var(w(t)) + 1/2(1 − 1/2)
=Var(w˜(t)) + Var
(
w˜(t)− w˜(t− 1))
=Var(w˜(t)) + Var
(
w˜(t− 1)− w˜(t))
=Var(w˜(t− 1)).
The third line uses the fact that the covariance between w(t) and w(t−1)−w(t) is not positive, the
fifth and seventh lines use the fact that w(t)− w(t− 1) and w˜(t)− w˜(t− 1) are Bernoulli random
variables, and the last line uses the fact that w˜(t− 1)− w˜(t) is uncorrelated with w˜(t).
Fifth, the variance of w˜(t) equals the variance of a Binomial(n− t, 1/2) random variable, which
is (n − t)/4. And combining this with the previous result yields Var(w(t)) ≤ (n− t)/4.
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Sixth, your regret would not be larger if you could minimize your myopic regret without influ-
encing the distribution of your future state variables, which inductively implies
rn,k =mn,k(pn,k) + pn,krn−1,k−1 + (1− pn,k)rn−1,k
≥ min
p∈[0,1]
mn,k(p) + pn,krn−1,k−1 + (1− pn,k)rn−1,k
=mn,k(p̂n,k) + pn,krn−1,k−1 + (1− pn,k)rn−1,k
≥
n∑
t=1
E
(
mt,w(t)(p̂t,w(t))
)
≥
n∑
t=
√
n
E
(
mt,w(t)(p̂t,w(t))
)
=
n∑
t=
√
n
1
8(t+ 1)
− E
(
(2w(t) − t)2)
8t2(t+ 1)
,
where the fifth line stems from the fact that mt,w(t)(p̂t,w(t)) ≥ 0, and the last line uses the myopic
regret expression from section 4.
Seventh, identities E(w(t)) = t/2 and Var(w(t)) ≤ (n− t)/4 imply that E ((2w(t)− t)2) ≤ n− t,
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which, for n ≥ 16, yields2
rn,k ≥
n∑
t=
√
n
1
8(t+ 1)
− n− t
8t2(t+ 1)
=
1
8
n∑
t=
√
n
1
t
− n
t2(t+ 1)
>
1
8
(∫ n+1
t=
√
n
1
t
dt−
∫ n
t=
√
n−1
n
t2(t+ 1)
dt
)
=
1
8
(
log
(
n+ 1√
n
)
+ 1 + n log
(
1 +
n−√n+ 1
(
√
n− 1)(n + 1)
)
− n√
n− 1
)
>
1
8
(log(n)/2− 2)
= log(n)/16 − 1/4.
6 Conclusion
Why does extending the range of secretary valuations from finite set {v1, · · · , vℓ} to infinite set [0, 1]
break Arlotto and Gurvich’s (2019) result? Well, in the former case, secretaries are interchangeable
parts, which means that your hiring errors can be perfectly “undone” in the future. For example,
you can confidently reject the marginal candidate in Arlotto and Gurvich’s setting because you
know that you’ll see his like again (many times over). But no two men are alike when values are
drawn from the uniform distribution. So, in this case, your hiring mistakes cannot be undone—they
will linger forever, making you ever more regretful.
2 Note that log(1 + x) ≥ x− x2/2 for x ≥ 0. And this identity implies, for n ≥ 16,
log
(
1 +
n−√n+ 1
(
√
n− 1)(n+ 1)
)
− 1√
n− 1
≥ n−
√
n+ 1
(
√
n− 1)(n+ 1) −
1
2
(
n−√n+ 1
(
√
n− 1)(n+ 1)
)2
− 1√
n− 1
=−
√
n
(
√
n− 1)(n+ 1) −
1
2
(
n−√n+ 1
(
√
n− 1)(n+ 1)
)2
≥−
√
n
(
√
n− 1)(n− 1) −
1
2(
√
n− 1)2
≥−
√
n
(
√
n− 1)2(√n+ 1) −
1
2(
√
n− 1)2
≥− 3
2(
√
n− 1)2
≥− 3/n.
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Alright, fine, so your regret increases. But why does it increase at a log(n) rate? Well, it’s clear
that the standard deviation of the kth order statistic will be on the order of 1/
√
n (provided that
k is also on the order of n), which roughly means that the kth order statistic will reside within a
“confidence interval” that’s on the order of 1/
√
n. And this has two implications. First, you’ll only
have around a 1/
√
n chance of making a hiring mistake, because the optimal action is unambiguous
unless the of the current man’s capability lies within the confidence interval. Second, the cost of
such a mistake will also be around 1/
√
n, because the capability of the man you should have hired
and the capability of the man you did hire will both reside in the confidence interval. Thus, your
expected per-period regret will be on the order of 1/
√
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
mistake probability
· 1/√n︸ ︷︷ ︸
mistake cost
= 1/n, which means
that your total regret grow like the harmonic series.
For brevity I have focused on Arlotto and Gurvich’s (2019) multisecretary problem. But just
as Arlotto and Gurvich’s (2019) initial insight applies more broadly (see Vera and Banerjee, 2019;
Bumpensanti and Wang, 2018; Vera et al., 2019), the idea outlined above should likewise generalize.
For example, in a revenue management setting, we should expect around a log(n) regret whenever
we can (i) choose a continuous price and (ii) forecast the resource “shadow prices” to around a
1/
√
n tolerance.
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